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Abstract
We propose the concept of ﬁne-grained forward-secure signature schemes. Such signature schemes not only provide non-
repudiation w.r.t. past time periods the way ordinary forward-secure signature schemes do but, in addition, allow the signer to
specify which signatures of the current time period remain valid when revoking the public key. This is an important advantage if
the signer produces many signatures per time period as otherwise the signer would have to re-issue those signatures (and possibly
re-negotiate the respective messages) with a new key.
Apart from a formal model for ﬁne-grained forward-secure signature schemes, we present practical schemes and prove them
secure under the strong RSA assumption only, i.e., we do not resort to the random oracle model to prove security. As a side-result,
we provide an ordinary forward-secure scheme whose key-update time is signiﬁcantly smaller than that of known schemes which
are secure without assuming random oracles.
© 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Ordinary digital signature schemes suffer from a fundamental shortcoming: when the public key is revoked, e.g.,
because the secret key got exposed, all signatures made become reputable. Therefore ordinary signature schemes by
themselves cannot provide non-repudiation.
One possibility to overcome this problem is to use a so-called time-stamping service. Here, each signature is sent to
a trusted third party who signs a message containing the signature and the current date and time. A signature is now
considered non-reputable if its time-stamp predates the time of the public-key’s revocation. Hence non-repudiation is
guaranteed, assuming that the secret key of the time-stamping service is never leaked. However, such a time-stamping
service is likely to be a bottle-neck, in particular as running such a service is a difﬁcult task similar to the one of running
a certiﬁcation authority. Hence this solution is not very desirable.
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Another solution to the problem is to change the keys frequently, e.g., every day, and to delete past secret keys. It
then is understood that a signature is valid if the user did not revoke the corresponding public key during the same time
period she used that key.
In practice, however, the user must be allowed to revoke the key also for sometime after the period has passed. This is
because some time must be allowed to the user to discover key leakage and for a revocation request to be processed by
the certiﬁcation authority. Note that as long as the time period plus the extra time allowed has not passed one cannot be
sure about a signature’s non-repudiation because a (dishonest) signer can always revoke the key to “recall” a signature.
This, however, seems to be unavoidable.
Unfortunately, changing the keys frequently either requires repeated interaction with the certiﬁcation authority to
register the public keys or, otherwise, the public key becomes large (e.g., consists of a list of daily public keys). This
drawback is overcome by forward-secure signature as introduced by Anderson [2] (and formalized by Bellare and
Miner [3]). These schemes allow the users to have a different secret key for each time period but only a single (small)
public key [3,1,14,17,16]. In fact, most forward-secure signature schemes allow one to derive the secret key for the
current period from the one of the previous period in a one-way fashion, that is, there is only a single small secret key
as well. See [9] for an empirical performance evaluation of several forward-secure signatures.
Still, forward-secure signature schemes are not completely satisfactory as (at least) all the signatures made in the
current time period become invalid when the user revokes the public key. Hence the signer needs to re-issue those
signatures (and possibly re-negotiate the corresponding messages) with a new key.
One way to solve this problem is to update the secret key very frequently, e.g., every second. This is of course only
feasible if the secret-key update is very efﬁcient. This is the case for the scheme by Kozlov and Reyzin [16] and the
scheme obtained from the MMM construction [17] applied to the Schnorr signature scheme [20]. Unfortunately, they
both are not provably secure in the strict sense: they are only proven secure in the random oracle model [4], which is
a heuristic only (in fact, it has been proven that such oracles cannot be realized with any hash function [5,19]). For the
known schemes that are provably secure in the strict sense, the time to update the secret key is difﬁcult to accept.
In this paper we propose ﬁne-grained forward-secure signature schemes as a better solution. The idea here is that,
apart from using a new secret key for each time period, each signature carries an ascending index such that once an
index is used (and the secret key updated accordingly), no signature can be made w.r.t. a lower index. Thus, whenever
the secret key gets compromised, the signer can just announce the index used before the secret key got compromised.
In comparison with standard forward-secure schemes, we clearly gain a new level of security within each time period.
Moreover with ﬁne-grained forward-secure schemeswe can avoid unnecessary and expensive very frequent key updates
which always take place in case of ordinary forward-secure scheme with very short time periods.
Apart from putting forth a formal model of ﬁne-grained forward-secure signature schemes, we also present prac-
tical schemes that are provably secure under the strong RSA assumption. Our schemes also give rise to an ordinary
forward-secure signature scheme for t time-periods, the secret-key update time of which is about a factor(log t) faster
than that of the best-known schemes which are provably secure in the strict sense while the time to sign a message is
essentially the same.
Recently, key-insulated signature schemes [11] and intrusion-resilient signatures [15] have been introduced. In
these schemes not only past but also future secret keys remain secure in case the current secret key is compromised.
Unfortunately, those solutions require the signer’s communication with a safe computing device and assume that both
this device and the signer’s system cannot be broken into during the same time period. We stress that the schemes
we propose do not require the existence of such additional devices. Nevertheless, our ﬁne-grained techniques could
be combined with key-insulated and intrusion-resilient signatures to provide them with supplementary ﬁne-grained
forward security within each time period.
The organization of the paper. In the following section we put forth our deﬁnition of ﬁne-grained forward-secure sig-
natures. In Section 3 we construct ﬁne-grained forward-secure schemes with a single time-period, which are employed
in Sections 4 and 5 to build a new ordinary forward-secure signature scheme and three ﬁne-grained forward-secure
signature schemes, respectively. Section 6 concludes with a brief summary of our results.
2. Model
We now formally deﬁne the notion of ﬁne-grained forward-secure signature scheme. Our model resembles the
deﬁnitions of forward-secure signature scheme by Bellare and Miner [3]. The main difference is that instead of only
considering time periods we also take into account the order of signatures in time.
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We ﬁrst describe the ingredients of ﬁne-grained key-evolving signature schemes and then deﬁne their forward
security.
Deﬁnition 1. Let k be a security parameter, I the maximal amount of signatures that can be made per time period, and
T the maximal amount of time-periods. A ﬁne-grained key-evolving signature scheme consists of the following four
procedures.
KG(k, I, T ). The key generation algorithm takes as input k, I, and T and outputs a public key PK and an initial secret
key SK(0,0).
Upd(SK(t,i)). The (time-period) update algorithm takes as input the current secret key SK(t,i) and outputs the secret
key SK(t+1,0) for the next time-period.
Sig(m, SK(t,i)). On input a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ and the current secret key SK(t,i), this algorithm outputs either a
signature (t, i, ) and a new secret key SK(t,i+1), or the symbol ⊥.
Ver(PK,m′, (t ′, i′, ′)). On input a public key PK, a message m′ and a candidate signature (t ′, i′, ′) the veriﬁcation
algorithm outputs either 1 or 0.
A useful signing algorithm outputs ⊥ only exceptionally, e.g., if all T time-periods have passed, or if the maximum
amount of I signatures (per time-period) were already made. Note that each signature carries a unique index (t, i).
Deﬁnition 2 (Validity of Signatures). Asignature (t, i, ) on amessagem is considered valid ifVer(PK,m, (t, i, ))=1
and t is not a future time period. However, if the signer revoked the public key w.r.t. the signature index i′ in time-period
t ′, then additionally either t < t ′ or i < i′ ∧ t = t ′ must hold.
Let R be the extra time allowed to the signer and the certiﬁcation authority to process a revocation. Note that the
validity of a signature is deﬁnitely determined only when the time period t plus an extra time margin R has passed.
We extend the notion of adaptively chosen message attacks [13] to ﬁne-grained forward-secure signature schemes.
Consider the following games with an adversary.
Game 1. First, the key generation algorithm is run and the public key is sent to the adversary. Next, the adversary
can ask for signatures on arbitrary messages. Let M denote the set of all messages which the adversary asked to sign
and denote (m(t,i), (t, i, (t,i))) the resulting message-signature pairs. If the adversary announces that he breaks in,
he is handed the current secret key SK(tA,iA), where tA and iA are the current indices, and the game ends. The game
ends as well, if all time-periods have passed in which case we set tA := T and iA := I . After the game has ended, the
adversary is required to output a message m′ and a signature (t ′, i′, ′). The adversary wins the game if the conditions
Ver(PK,m′, (t ′, i′, ′)) = 1, m′ /∈M and either t ′ < tA or t ′ = tA ∧ i′ < iA hold3 .
Deﬁnition 3 (Security). A ﬁne-grained key-evolving signature scheme (KG, Upd, Sig, Ver) is said to provide security
if there exists no polynomial-time adversary who wins Game 1 with probability that is non-negligible in k.
It should now be clear from Deﬁnition 3/Game 1 that the signer can maintain the validity of all the signatures made
up to the point when the secret key gets compromised, and not only those made in prior time-periods.
A user can revoke her public key by signing a so-called revocation message and sending it to the certiﬁcation
authority. The revocation message must include indices t and i deﬁning that the key leakage occurred during the tth
time period after the ith message was signed. The certiﬁcation authority veriﬁes that this signed revocation message
was issued during the current time period and then publishes it.Alternatively, the certiﬁcation authority can time-stamp
the revocation message and then publish it. In the latter case, veriﬁers need to check by themselves, whether the time-
stamp corresponds to the appropriate time period. This way a dishonest signer can recall only the signatures made in
the current time period (and in the previous one if R has not yet passed). In case a honest signer has noticed a break-in
after the ith message was signed, he has the possibility to announce the index i (together with time period t) which
protects the signatures issued prior to that break-in even during the current time period.
3 Some schemes actually satisfy a stronger security deﬁnition where one requires only that m′ = m(t ′,i′) instead of m′ /∈M .
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If we do not make such an assumption about existence of a trusted authority, there is no way a (dishonest) signer can
be prevented from revoking all the signatures issued.
Technically, signing the revocation message can be done in different ways. One is to employ a separate signature
scheme the keys of which are kept extremely safe and used only very rarely, e.g., only when leakage of keys for ﬁne-
grained protocol happens. If one ﬁnds it too inconvenient, one could also apply the ﬁne-grained scheme itself to sign
its revocation message. In this case it is necessary that we allow the signer to revoke a key several times as otherwise an
adversary who knows the secret key could send a revocation message with an index i′′ that is higher than the signer’s
current index i. Obviously, in the second scenario we assume that a proper revocation message is the one announcing
the lowest message index (t, i). However, this solution has the drawback that the ﬁne-grained property is lost, as the
adversary can invalidate all signatures of the current time period (or also the previous one if the R has not passed yet).
3. Fine-grained forward-secure signature schemes with a single time period
In this sectionwe provide ﬁne-grained forward-secure schemeswhich allow for one time period only; thus a dishonest
signer could recall all the signatures he made with it. These schemes, however, are not our ﬁnal ones but rather form
the basis for the schemes we construct in the following sections.
In principle, a ﬁne-grained forward-secure signature scheme with a single time period can be obtained from any
ordinary forward-secure signature scheme S by abandoning the ﬁxed time periods: to sign the ith message m, one uses
the ith time-period’s secret key of S, and then updates the secret-key of S.
In fact, using the scheme obtained by applying the MMM construction [17] to the Schnorr signature scheme [20] in
this way gives a pretty efﬁcient ﬁne-grained forward-secure signature scheme with a single time-period. However, it is
provably secure only in the random oracle model. Unfortunately, applying the MMM construction to any of the known
signature schemes that are provably secure in the strict sense yields no efﬁcient ﬁne-grained forward-secure signature
scheme. This is because we now sign only one message per time period and therefore signing does include running the
key-generation algorithm of the underlying signature schemewhich for here consists of the costly generation of an RSA
modulus. One could also use the MMM construction with a one-time signature scheme, which would be more efﬁcient
but result in longer signatures. This section is therefore dedicated to efﬁcient ﬁne-grained forward-secure signature
scheme with a single time period that are provably secure in the strict sense.
3.1. Scheme I: basic scheme with a single time period
The schemewe propose in this section is based on the (standard) signature scheme due to Fischlin [12] that is provably
secure under the strong RSA assumption. We obtain forward security by pre-computing some roots that are used to
sign a message, deleting the factorization of the modulus after the key generation, and then deleting a pre-computed
root after it was used to sign a message. Similar techniques were used in previous forward-secure signature schemes
[3,1,14].
Let k and  be security parameters. For current security requirements we suggest k =2000 and =160.With respect
to efﬁciency, we suggest I = 1024. LetH(·) be a collision-resistant hash function whose output is of size  bits, i.e.,
for any s ∈ {0, 1}∗ we have 0H(s)< 2. Finally, let QRN denote the subgroup of squares of Z∗N .
We now describe the algorithm of our scheme I. Note that because we only allow for a single time period, there is
no Upd(·) algorithm.
KG(k, I ):
(1) Choose two random safe primes of size about k/2 bits, i.e., primes p and q such that (p − 1)/2 and (q − 1)/2 are
primes as well, and let N = pq be their product.
(2) Choose a random seed W and use it with some pseudo-random generator to select I random  + 1-bit prime
numbers ei∈R]2l (1 + (i/I )), 2l (1 + (i + 1)/I )[ for i = 0, . . . , I − 1.
(3) Draw random elements gˆ0, hˆ0, xˆ0∈RQRN and compute e :=
∏
0 i<I ei mod(N), g := gˆe0, h := hˆe0, and
x := xˆe0.
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(4) Output PK := (N, g, h, x,W, I)4 and SK0 := (0, gˆ0, hˆ0, xˆ0).
Sig(m, (i, gˆi , hˆi , xˆi )):
(1) If i = I then output ⊥ and quit.
(2) Compute elements gi , hi , and xi such that
g
ei
i = g, heii = h and xeii = x.
(3) Choose a random element ∈R{0, 1} and compute
y := xigi h⊕H(m)i .
(4) Update the secret key: compute
gˆi+1 := gˆeii , hˆi+1 := hˆeii and xˆi+1 := xˆeii
and set SKi+1 := (i + 1, gˆi+1, hˆi+1, xˆi+1).
(5) Output the signature (i, (ei, y, ))5 and the new secret key SKi+1.
Ver(PK,m, i, (e′, y, ):
(1) If i /∈ [0, I [ output 0.
(2) If either e′ is even or e′ /∈]2l (1 + (i/I )), 2l (1 + (i + 1)/I )[ output 0.
(3) Output 1 if
ye
′ = xgh⊕H(m)
holds and 0 otherwise.
Remark 1. In Step 2 of the Sig algorithm, the value gi can be computed as gi := gˆ
∏
i<j<I ej
i from gˆi because we have
g = gˆ
∏
i j<I ej
i by construction. Analogous statements hold for hi and xi . However, this requires O(I ) exponentiations
to produce a signature which might be far too expensive for many applications. Trading-in a little bit of storage use, a
more efﬁcient way to compute these values is to use the pebbling method due to Itkis and Reyzin [14]. We discuss it
in Section 3.1.2.
Theorem 1. Scheme I is a ﬁne-grained forward-secure signature scheme with a single time-period according to
Deﬁnition 3 if the strong RSA assumption holds and the hash functionH(·) is collision-resistant.
Much of the proof of this theorem is similar to the corresponding proofs given by Cramer and Shoup [8] and by
Fischlin [12] for their respective ordinary signature schemes.
Proof. Assume there exists a forger who is allowed to adaptively ask for signatures on messages until some index iA,
0 iAI , when he asks to see all the secrets the signer possesses at that time. Finally, the forger outputs a signature
on a message m with index E˜< iA that was not signed by the signer with index E˜, i.e., the forger outputs values (e′, y, )
and m such that
0 E˜< iA, 2(1 + E˜/I)< e′ < 2l (1 + (E˜ + 1)/I ) and ye′ = xgh⊕H(m)
holds. We now show such a forger cannot exist provided the strong RSA assumption holds, i.e., we show how to solve
the ﬂexible RSA problem given such a forger.
We are given an instance (N, z), with z ∈ Z∗N , of the ﬂexible RSA problem.
4 The seed W can as well be a part of the secret key instead, since the veriﬁer does not have to know it.
5 In practice the index i can be removed from signatures, as it can be deduced from ei . We keep it here for the sake of simplicity.
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We choose I random unique (l + 1)-bit primes ei∈R]2l (1 + (i/I )), 2l (1 + (i + 1)/I )[, i = 0, . . . , I − 1 using a
random seed W and some pseudo-random number generator.
We draw a random j∈R0, . . . , I − 1.
The plan of our proof is following. We prepare signer’s public key with the above primes and sign iAI messages
presented by the forger. Finally the forger asks for the secret key with index iA. All data provided to her must be
distributed as in real life. If she outputs a new forged signature (e′, y, )with the index E˜ iA then j = E˜ with probability
at least 1/I which will allow us to ﬁnd a non-trivial root of z.
Let us describe the details.Analogously to Fischlin [12] we distinguish two kinds of forgeries: Type II, where e′ = ej
holds and Type III, where e′ = ej . We consider these two scenarios.
Type II:Assume that (j, (ej , yj , j ))will be our signature onmj , we have to guess whether j =  or j ⊕H(mj ) =
 ⊕H(m) will be the case for the adversary’s forged signature (j, (ej , y, )) on m. (Note that H(mj ) = H(m)
because m = mj as otherwise it would not be a forged signature.) So we guess that j =  will happen (the case
j ⊕H(mj ) =  ⊕H(m) can be treated similarly, cf. [12]). To produce a signer’s public key, we choose random
v,w∈RZ∗n, and ∈R{0, 1}l and compute
g := z2
∏I−1
i=0;i =j ei , h := v2
∏I−1
i=0 ei and x := w2
∏I−1
i=0 ei g−.
We set the public key to (N, g, h, x,W, I). Note that the public key has the same distribution as one that is obtained
by the key generation algorithm.
Now we are ready to answer the adversary’s queries: To sign a message mi , with 0 i < I and i = j , we chose
i∈R{0, 1} and compute
yi := w2
∏
s =i es z2(i−)
∏
s =i,s =j es v2(i⊕H(mi))
∏
s =i es
and to sign the message mj we set j =  and compute
yj := w2
∏
s =j es v2(j⊕H(mj ))
∏
s =j es
.
It is not hard to see that this produces valid signatures having the same distribution as signatures produced by a real
signer.
After the adversary has asked for signatures on messages m0, . . . , miA−1 and requests to see the secret key, we
compute
gˆ := z2
∏iA−1
s=0;s =j es , hˆ := v2
∏iA−1
s=0 es and xˆ := w2
∏iA−1
s=0 (es )g−
and send her (gˆ, hˆ, xˆ).
Now, suppose the adversary stops and outputs a valid signature (E˜, eE˜, y, ) on a message m such that m = mE˜ and
E˜< iA.
As the adversary could not learn any information about j, with probability at least 1/I we have that E˜ = j . We get
g−j h−(j⊕H(mj ))yejj = x = g−h−(⊕H(m))yej
and thus
g−j = h(j⊕H(mj ))−(⊕H(m))(y/yj )ej .
By replacing g and h we ﬁnally get
z
(−j )2∏I−1s=0;s =j es = (v((j⊕H(mj ))−(⊕H(m)))2
∏I−1
s=0;s =j (es ) y/yj )
ej
.
Therefore, we can compute an ej th root of z (and solve the provided instance) if
ej  (− j )2
I−1∏
s=0;s =j
es (1)
holds. First note that | − j |< 2 < ej . Furthermore, we know that the prime ej does not divide any ei for i = j .
From this (1) follows.
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Type III: This case is similar to the Type II case. Here we have e′ = ei for all 0 i < I .
We choose random c and d∈RZ∗N2 and compute
g := z2
∏I−1
i=0 ei , x := gc and h := hd .
We set the public key to (N, g, h, x,W, I). Now, as we can compute ei th roots of x, g, and h we are ready to answer
the adversary’s queries on any of m0, . . . , miA−1. As in the previous case we can also easily compute the secret key
SKiA and reveal to the forger.
The adversary stops and outputs a valid signature (j, e′, a, y) on a message m. Thus e′ is an odd number in the
interval ]2l (1 + j/I), 2l (1 + (j + 1)/I )[ and
ye
′ = xgh⊕H(m) = z(c++(⊕H(m))d)2
∏
i=1,...,I ei
.
Let c = c1(N) + c2 with 0c2 <(N). Then clearly forger has almost no information about c1. Now let p0 be a
prime factor p0 of e′. As p0 (N) the forger has almost no information about cmodp0. Therefore with probability at
least 12 we have e
′  (c + + (⊕H(m))d). As gcd(e′,(N)2∏i=1,...,I ei) = 1 we can compute a non-trivial root of z
and again solve the provided instance of the ﬂexible RSA problem.
If the success probability of the forger is 	, then the success probability of our reduction is 	(1/2I ). 
When we later use this scheme as a building block, the RSA modulus N and even the prime exponents e0, . . . , eI−1
are given to the key generation algorithm as an input. This, however, does not compromise the security of the scheme
as long as N and the exponents e0, . . . , eI−1 have been chosen appropriately. For instance, the same exponents and N
can be used with different g, h, and x.
3.1.1. Efﬁciency analysis
We assume that evaluating a hash function takes O(l2) bit-operations (of course only on inputs of reasonable size),
multiplying an a-bit and a b-bit number takes O(ab) bit-operations, and raising a number to power of size b-bits over
a modulus of size a-bits takes O(a2b) bit-operations.
Most of our analysis will concern the standard version of our Scheme I. We will also comment an option when the
RSA modulus and the prime exponents are set by some higher level protocol.
Key generation. Here we assume that generating a k/2-bit safe prime requires time O((k/2)5/log2(k/2)) which is
not proven, but widely accepted.
We need to compute:
• the RSA k-bit modulus N: O(2(k/2)5/log2(k/2)) time,
• I distinct primes of size l + 1: O(I4/ log ) bit operations if we assume that we need O() trials in each interval
of width 2/I before ﬁnding a prime
• g := gˆ
∏I−1
i=0 ei and analogously h and x: as we know the factorization of N =pq we can ﬁrst compute the product
e := e0...eI−1 mod((p − 1)/2)((q − 1)/2) and then g := gˆe: O(I lk + k3) time.)
We note that in some applications the modulus N can be given to the key generation algorithm as an input. In that case
computing g, h, and x requires O(I lk2) bit operations. Also, if the prime exponents are part of an input, we obviously
do not need to (re-)generate them.
Public key size. It is easy to verify that the public key has 4k + |W | + log2 I + 1 bits. W.l.o.g. we can assume that
the size of the random seed is l. Note that the seed W does not have to be a part of the public key.
Secret key size. By inspection it is 3k + log2 I + 1. If we assume that prime exponents are kept in memory instead
of being regenerated each time that amounts to (I − i)(l + 1) bits.
Signing. Computinggi := gˆ
∏
i<j<I ej
i−1 requires (I−i) exponentiationswith an (l+1)-bit exponent and re-computations
of prime exponents,which isO(I (k2+4/ log )) bit operations. Ifwe assume that prime exponents are kept inmemory
the running time of signing is O(Ik2).
Signature size. By inspection it is k + 2l + 1 bits.
Verifying. It needs one application of the hash functionH() and three exponentiations with (l + 1)-bit exponents
over k-bit RSA modulus. That requires time O(lk2).
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3.1.2. More efﬁcient signing using Pebbling
While signing one needs to compute roots gi := g1/ei , where g= gˆ
∏
0 j<I ej
0 . Also, one needs to consecutively erase
the roots of g after employing them to sign.
A straightforward way to do this is following. Let gˆ = gˆi where g = gˆ
∏
i j<I ej
i . This way gˆ = gˆi contains no
information about e0, . . . , ei−1 roots of g and we can compute ei th root of g as gi := gˆ
∏
i<j<I ej
i . This, however, is quite
expensive in terms of computation.
Itkis and Reyzin [14] proposed the so called pebbling algorithm which allows one to compute such roots efﬁciently
at the expense of additional secure storage space. Their main idea is that instead of computing ei th root of g each time
almost from scratch, one stores several roots of form g1/
∏
j=imin ..imax ej and employs them in order to compute ei th root
more efﬁciently. This is done in a way such that “used” roots are erased, so that the forward-security property is not
compromised.
Essentially, the pebbling algorithm keeps a number of elements in memory, each of them with four indices. Two of
these indices imin and imax deﬁne that a particular element should store the (
∏
j=imin..imaxej )th root of g. One step in
the pebbling algorithm corresponds to one exponentiation with an (l + 1)-bit exponent.
By [14, Theorem 3], to compute an ei th root of g we need at most 1 + log2(I − i) single exponentiations only.
Furthermore, the pebbling algorithm requires at most (1 + log2(I − i)) elements in memory, each of them consisting
from four integer indices from the interval [0, . . . , I ] and a number fromZN . The pre-computation phase requires O(I )
steps.
We discuss below how the parameters of our basic signature scheme are affected by the pebbling algorithm and
present improvements applicable to our particular case.
Signing. By the properties of the pebbling algorithmwe need 1+log2(I −i) single exponentiations with an (l+1)-bit
exponent and re-computations of those prime exponents. That requires O(log(I )(k2 + 4/ log l)) bit operations.
If we assume that prime exponents are kept in memory, we obtain O(log(I )lk2) signing time.
Secret key size. The pebbling algorithm requires to store at most (1 + log2 (I − i)) elements in memory. With each
element we associate four indices. As we run the pebbling algorithms to compute roots of g, h and x, the size of secret
key is at most (1 + log2 (I − i))(3k + 4 log2 I + 4) bits.
Key generation. Apart from the ordinary key generation, whose complexity was studied in the previous subsection,
we need to run the pre-computation phase of the pebbling algorithm. In particular, we are assuming that the prime
exponents are not re-computed during the pebbling pre-computation phase because they were constructed or given at
the previous stage of key generation. First we show a simple technical result.
Fact 1. For any integer m1 we have
m log2 m −
m − 1
log 2
 log2 (m!) m log2 m.
Proof. Obviously
log2 (m!)
∫ m
1
log2 t dt = m log2 m −
m − 1
log 2
. 
By the Fact 1 and [14, Theorem 3] the pre-computation phase for the pebbling algorithm requires at most (I/2)(1+
(1/ log 2))< 1.3I exponentiations. That gives us O(I lk2) bit operations.
However, as during the standard key generation for our Scheme I we know the factorization of the modulus N =pq,
we can use it in the pre-computation phase of the pebbling algorithm. This speeds up the pebbling pre-computation to
O(Ikl + log(I )k3) bit-operations.
Example with concrete parameters.Assume k=2000, I =1024 and l=160. Then the size of public key and signature
is respectively 8170 and 2321 bits. Presuming that pebbling was used the size of secret key would be at most 66 440
bits. If we would like to keep in memory I − i of 161-bit prime exponents they would occupy at most 164 864 bits.
Concerning generating (l + 1)-bit prime exponents, by analysis and empirical tests of Cramer and Shoup [8] we
know that computational cost of generating a 161-bit prime is not very high. On average this corresponds to about the
cost of one exponentiation with a 1024-bit exponent and a 1024-bit RSA modulus.
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3.2. Scheme II: one-period ﬂat-tree scheme
Starting from our Scheme I, we now build a more efﬁcient ﬁne-grained forward-secure signature scheme with only
one period. We achieve a much faster key generation and we can avoid regenerating primes because here we need less
primes, so that it may become affordable to retain them in memory. Still, this scheme is not the ﬁnal solution but just
a building block for protocols presented in the following sections.
We recall the idea of ﬂat authentication trees (see e.g., [6,7,10]). Let us construct a tree of degree I0 and depth
d − 1. Each node of the tree is going to be associated with a different instance of our Scheme I with the maximal
number of signatures equal to I0. For the sake of simplicity and efﬁciency we use the same RSA modulus N and
the same primes e0, e1, ..., eI0−1 in all these instances, and only choose different random elements x, g, and h for
each of these instances. For each internal node, the associated scheme is used to authenticate the public keys of
the schemes of its children. As each leaf’s scheme allows us to sign I0 messages we can sign I = I d0 messages in
total.
The scheme we just described can be regarded as the iterated product composition from [17] applied to our Scheme
I. The scheme’s security thus follows the properties of the iterated product composition [17] and the security of Scheme
I. However, it is not difﬁcult to prove the scheme secure starting from ﬁrst principles (cf. also [6,7,10]).
We note that there is no need to store information about the schemes associated with all nodes in the tree. It is
sufﬁcient to keep in memory the information related to signature schemes at the nodes on the path from the root to the
actual leaf of the authentication tree.
The instances of our basic scheme at the leaf nodes should use the pebbling-method to improve performance of
signing. However, this is not necessary for the internal nodes of the authentication tree as there computing roots can be
distributed to the signing with the schemes associated with the children of the nodes such that the signing cost increases
only insigniﬁcantly.
Key generation. We choose a random RSA modulus N and (l + 1)-bit primes e0, . . . , eI0−1 with ei∈R]2l (1 +
(i/I0)), 2l (1 + (i + 1)/I0)[. For each node of the leftmost path in the tree we initiate an instance of Scheme I
with the same modulus N, the primes e0, . . . , eI0−1 and the number of signatures set to I0. We sign each public
key on the path to the leaf. We initiate also pebbling scheme for the scheme on the leaf node. That amounts to
O(2(k/2)5/log2 (k/2) + I0l4/ log l + I0lk + dk3 + log I0 · k3) = O(2(k/2)5/log2 (k/2) + I0l4/ log l + I0lk) bit
operations.
If the scheme is initiated with a given modulus N and primes e0, ..., eI0−1 we cannot assume that we know the
factorization of N. Therefore, the complexity of key generation becomes O(dI 0lk2).
Public key. The public key is the public key of the instantiation of the basic scheme associated with the root which
amounts to 4k +  + log2 I + 1 bits.
Signature. The signature consists from an authentication path from the root to the actual leaf node, so it corresponds
to d signatures and d − 1 public keys of the Scheme I. That is d(k + 2l + 1)+ (d − 1)3k = k(4d − 3)+ d(2l + 1) bits.
Veriﬁcation. It requires d veriﬁcation procedures of Scheme I, so veriﬁcation takes time O(dk2).
Signing and secret key size. On the leaf level d −1 we have the pebbling algorithm running while signing. That takes
time O(log(I0)(k2 +4/ log )) and space at most (1+ log2 I0)(3k+4 log2 I0 +4) bits. On top levels 0, . . . , d −2 we
are not using pebbling as the effort to compute roots for any of those schemes can be distributed into I0 steps when we
are using a respective lower level signature scheme. That requires performing at most three additional exponentiations
per signing operation and storing in memory additional three group elements of size k for each scheme on top levels
0, ..., d − 2 on the authentication path from root to the leaf. That amounts to O(4/ log  + k2) bit-operations and
O(dk) bits of memory.
Furthermore, while signing we can already generate keys for each of the levels 1, . . . , d − 1 for the next respective
signature scheme on that level. For levels 1, . . . , d − 2 that adds three exponentiations per local signing operation
and six group elements per local scheme. Concerning the bottom level d − 1, we can pre-compute the pebbling
values for next instance of the signature scheme while signing, which can be done with a constant number (at most
6) of exponentiations per signature. That amounts to O(log(I0)(k2 + 4/ log )) bit operations (or O(log(I0)k2)
if the prime exponents e0, . . . , eI0−1 are known) and secret key of size at most 2(1 + log2 I0)(3k + 4 log2 I0 + 4)
+ O(dk).
If prime exponents are kept in memory instead of being regenerated each time that requires additional I0(l + 1) bits.
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Concrete parameters: Suppose that wewant to sign at most I =232 messages. Let the security parameters be k=2000
and =160. Then we can set I0 =28 =256 and d =4. For storing 256 prime numbers we need 41 216 bits which can be
acceptable. Therefore we would not have to re-compute the primes. The signature occupies 2000 ·13+4 ·321=27 284
bits of memory and the secret key will be approximately of size at most 170 000 bits (plus 41 216 bits for prime
numbers).
4. An ordinary forward-secure signature scheme
In this section we construct a new ordinary forward-secure signature scheme from Scheme I. Our new scheme has a
much faster secret-key update time than previously known ones that are secure without assuming random oracles while
the signing-time is about the same.
Given any ﬁne-grained forward-secure signature scheme F for a single time period (such as the ones put forth in the
previous section) and some ordinary signature scheme S, one can build an ordinary forward-secure signature scheme
F ′ as follows. The public key of F ′ is generated by running the key generation of F. Furthermore, each signature index
i of F is assigned to the ith time-period of F ′. When time period t starts, the key generation algorithm of S is run and
the thereby-obtained public key Pt of S is signed with F using signature index t. Let us denote this signature by t .
Thus, the signature on message m that is produced in time period t consists of Pt , t , and the signature on m produced
with S using the secret key corresponding to Pt . This construction can be seen as the product composition [17] of F
and S.
Now, let F be Scheme I provided in Section 3 (with pebbling), let S be the Cramer–Shoup signature scheme [8]. The
efﬁciency analysis of the so obtained F ′ follows from the efﬁciency analysis done in the previous section.We compare
it with the efﬁciency of the scheme obtained by applying the MMM construction to the Cramer–Shoup signature
scheme, which was hitherto the most efﬁcient forward-secure signature scheme provably secure without assuming
random oracles. It is not hard to see that signing time for both schemes is the same, i.e., essentially the time of signing
a message with the Cramer–Shoup signature scheme. The secret-key update time of our scheme is dominated by one
generation of Cramer–Shoup keys. We have realized that in case of MMM scheme it is (log t) key generations of S
on average, where t is the number of time periods used so far. This is less efﬁcient than the constant number of key
generations as is claimed in [17]. This error in the analysis of the MMM scheme was also noticed by the authors of
that scheme [18].
Under usually satisﬁable conditions on the maximal number of time periods T, our key generation is also faster.
More precisely, for our scheme it includes one key generation of S and preparing the keys for F. In the MMM scheme,
the main effort in key generation is to initialize l signature schemes S. As long as T l3/ ln l < (k5)/(16 ln2 (k/2)) and
T < (k4)/(16 ln2 (k/2)) our construction is going to be faster than theMMM schemewith respect to the key generation.
For example, if k = 2000, l = 160, and T = 1024 then key generation for MMM would require approximately 252 bit
operations as opposed to approximately 245 bit operations for our scheme.
Secret key size is at most (1+ log2 (T ))(3k+4 log2 (T )+4)+(3k+ l+1)+k=k(3 log2 T +7)+ log2 T (4 log2 T +
5) + l + 5 bits in our protocol. A simple straightforward implementation of MMM needs O(k + l(log t + log l)) bits
of secret storage. If we require a fast worst-case update time that results (by our analysis and also [18]) in O(klog2t)
bits of secret storage.
5. Fine-grained forward-secure signature schemes
We now discuss ways to build full ﬂedged ﬁne-grained forward-secure signature schemes from any ﬁne-grained
forward-secure signature schemes with at least a single time period, e.g., the schemes presented in Section 3. All our
constructions have the property that if the underlying scheme is provably secure without assuming random oracles then
so is the resulting scheme.
Our ﬁrst two-level scheme is our most general and ﬂexible ﬁne-grained solution. In the second subsection we discuss
how to build a ﬁne-grained forward-secure signature provided that a public archive can be assumed, i.e. one can always
write a message in a public archive but no one is able to delete any message from it. We ﬁnish with a third scheme
specialized for the case when signing occurs very often.
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5.1. A two-level scheme
In this subsectionwe apply the ideas of the authentication-tree signatures schemes to construct a ﬁne-grained forward-
secure scheme. It turns out that the most efﬁcient way to do this is a tree of depth two.While the construction is generic,
the most efﬁcient solution is to use our one-period ﬂat-tree scheme (Scheme II) for authenticating the public keys of
the signature scheme of the second level, where our basic scheme (Scheme I) is employed. For simplicity, we call the
scheme used on the ﬁrst layer the A-scheme and the one used for the second layer the B-scheme.
Each index of the A-scheme corresponds to a time-period, i.e., index i denotes the time period Ti from t0 + i · t to
t0 + (i + 1)t, where t0 is the starting time and t is the duration of the time periods. The public key of this scheme
becomes the public key of A-scheme. Then, for each time-period Ti we use an instance of B-scheme and sign its public
key using the A-scheme using index i. After this, the secret key of the A-scheme is updated and its current index is set to
i + 1.
To sign the jth message of the current time period Ti , we use the Bi-scheme with index j. The signature on the
message consist of this signature, the public key of the Bi-scheme, and the signature on this public key made with the
A-scheme. Again, after signing the secret key of the Bi scheme is updated and new current index isj + 1.
Let us turn our attention to revocation.We remind the reader that a parameter R is published that indicates the time
allowed to the user to recognize that the secret key got compromised and to react upon this. Now, whenever a signer
wants to revoke her key w.r.t. index j ′ and time-period Ti′ , she (authentically) sends the TTP a message indicating this.
The TTP checks whether Ti′ denotes the current time period or whether less time than R has passed since the period
Ti′ ended. If this is the case the TTP accepts the revocation and publishes j ′ and Ti′ appropriately.
A user’s signature with indices i and j is considered valid if no revocation happened, or if a revocation w.r.t. indices
i′ and j ′ happened (where i′ and j ′ are the smallest indices published by the TTP), if i < i′ or i = i′ and j < j ′
holds.
5.1.1. Efﬁciency
We have I d0 time periods and at most I0 messages per time-period. To this end we assume that the parameter I0 is
reasonably small so that the I0 prime numbers (I0(l + 1) bits) can be stored by the signer. Otherwise they would have
to be generated on-line. We are reusing here the same RSA-modulus for all our one-period schemes.
PK size 4k + log2 I0 + log2 d + 2
SK size 4(1 + log2 I0)(3k + 4 log2 I0 + 4) + I0(l + 1) + O((d + 1)k)
Sign size k(4d + 1) + (d + 1)(2l + 1)
KeyGen time O(2(k/2)5/log2 (k/2) + 2I0k + I04/ log )
Sign time O(k2 log I0)
Ver time O((d + 1)k2)
Upd time O(k2I0)
Let I0 = 28, d = 3, l = 160 and k = 2000. Then, public key, secret key and signature are of size 8011, at most
290 000 + 28 · 161 ≈ 331 000, and 26676 bits, respectively.
We now show how to improve the key update operation at the end of each time period for our construction based
on Schemes I and II. The cost O(k2I0) is related with generating a new instance of Scheme I when a new time-
period begins. We can amortize it as follows. Assume that we sign at most I0/2 messages per time period. Instead
of generating a new Scheme I at the end of each time-period, we do it only if at least its I0/2 indices were already
used. Otherwise, we keep the same Scheme I (in particular its present secret key) and sign its public key with a
new index of Scheme II appropriate for a new time-period. This way we know that we generate a new Scheme I
only if we signed at least I0/2 times. Therefore we can distribute generating the keys of an instance of Scheme I
onto I0/2 steps. That results in the same order of cost of signing (O(k2 log I0)) bit operations and secret key of
size 5(1 + log2 I0)(3k + 4 log2 I0 + 4) + I0(l + 1) + O((d + 1)k) bits. This reduces the cost of key update to only
O(k2 log I0) bit operations.
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5.2. Using a public archive
The idea here is to replace the A-scheme in the previous solution with a public archive. We assume that it is not
possible to delete messages from the archive and that messages are published together with the exact time they were
received by the archive. Given such an archive, one can realize a ﬁne-grained forward-secure signature scheme using
only one instance of our one-period ﬂat-tree scheme as follows (one could use our basic scheme or any other one-period
ﬁne-grained forward-secure signature).
A signature on m is made with our one-period ﬂat-tree scheme (Scheme II) using the current index. After having
signed, the secret key is updated. At the end of each time period, the user signs a pre-determined message (e.g., “last
index used in time period Ti”) with the using the current index, say j, and then updates the secret key and sends this
index signature to the public archive. The public archive posts the message along with the time it received the signature.
Now, whenever a signer wants to revoke her key w.r.t. index j ′ and time-period Ti′ , she sends the TTP a message
indicating this. The TTP checks whether either Ti′ is the current time period or less than R time has passed since Ti′
has ended and whether j ′ is not smaller than the index j of the index signature the signer put in the public archive for
the time period Ti′−1. If all these checks succeed, the TTP publishes j ′ and Ti′ .
In this solution, a user’s signature with index j is considered valid if no revocation happened, or if revocation
happened, if j < j ′, where j ′ is the smallest index of any revocation signatures published by the TTP.
5.2.1. Efﬁciency
PK size 4k + log2 I0 + log2 d + 2
SK size 2(1 + log2 I0)(3k + 4 log2 I0) + I0( + 1) + O((d + 1)k)
Sign size k(4d + 1) + (d + 1)(2 + 1)
KeyGen time O(2(k/2)5/log2 (k/2) + I0k + I04/ log )
Sign time O(k2 log I0)
Ver time O((d + 1)k2)
Upd time essentially no computation
For concrete parameters, the sizes of public key, secret key and signature are 8011, at most 170 000 + 28 · 161 ≈
211 000 and 26676 bits, respectively.
5.3. Allowing s signatures per time-period
In this solution a single instance of a one-period ﬁne-grained forward-secure signature scheme is sufﬁcient as
well. The idea is to bind the signature indices to time-periods by allowing exactly s signatures per time-period. The
parameter s (together with t0 and t) needs to be published as part of the public key. Thus, in time-period Ti , the indices
is, . . . , (i + 1)s − 1 can be used to sign.
To revoke her public key w.r.t. index j ′ the user sends a message indicating this to the TTP. The TTP publishes the
index j ′ if it matches the current time-period or if it matches the prior time-period and less time that R has passed
since the end of it. A signature with index j is considered valid if no revocation happened or, in case a revocation w.r.t.
index j ′ was done, if j < j ′ holds.
The rationale behind this proposal is that themainwork of signing amessage actually consists of the secret-key update.
Thus, one could calculate how many signatures one can possibly issue during a time period given the computational
power one has and then set s to this number. Then, one would constantly perform the secret key update, even if no
message was signed. This approach would not change the response behavior of the system very much, but it does
not require a public archive. Moreover it contains only one level with a single-period ﬁne-grained protocol which in
particular implies that after each time period its update would be very fast.
From the practical point of view we comment that this scheme is for instance suitable for servers devoted only
to signing. In that case performing operations often even without actually signing a document is acceptable as it is
supposed to be the only application running on such server. Furthermore, on the security side, employing a server only
for one important service is appropriate.
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5.3.1. Efﬁciency
Here we have at most I d0 messages and I
d
0 /s time periods.
PK size 4k + log2 I0 + log2 d + 2
SK size 2(1 + log2 I0)(3k + 4 log2 I0) + I0(l + 1) + O(dk)
Sign size k(4d − 3) + d(2 + 1)
KeyGen O(2(k/2)5/log2 (k/2) + I0k + I04/ log )
Sign time6 O(k2 log I0)
Ver time O(dk2)
Upd time O(k2 log I0)
Let d = 4. Then, the sizes of public key, secret key and signature are 8012, at most 170 000 + 28 · 161 ≈ 211 000
and 26 676 bits, respectively.
5.4. Summarizing the three ﬁne-grained schemes
The two-level scheme is the most general and ﬂexible among our proposals. It can be employed essentially in any
conditions. The two other schemes are aimed at particular applications.Most importantly, they enjoy a simpler one-level
construction which implies shorter secret keys and some efﬁciency gains as well.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced and formally deﬁned the new notion of ﬁne-grained forward-secure signatures.
We proposed a few such protocols and proved them secure under the strong RSA assumption without residing to the
random oracle model. Moreover, as a side-effect, we have also constructed a new ordinary forward-secure signature
scheme, hitherto the most efﬁcient among such schemes which are provably secure.
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